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Abstracts 
The corporate restructuring is used as mechanism to create value of the shareholders. It gives oppor-
tunity to make investment in other company with high potential but lower rate of return. By taking 
over such companies, the acquiring company redeems profit and creates value for their shareholders 
without diluting their right and altering main business operations. However, the value of acquired 
company shareholders is equally imperative as of acquiring company (Teece and Shuen, 1997), and 
(Coase, 1937). In present paper the performance of acquired company has been measured by taking 
three dimensions into account viz., actual return, estimated return and abnormal return. The beta 
coefficients of BSE-S&P 500 have been taken as proxy for return on estimation basis. To execute the 
hypotheses paired sample t-test, regression for estimation and cumulative abnormal return methods 
are applied. The study finds that the share price of acquired company remained low in pre-
acquisition period and became a cause of acquisition, similar to Porter (1985), Thomas (1996), and 
Dewey (1961). Post-acquisition performance could not meet the standard of expected returns and 
stays lower in majority cases akin to Hogarty (1970), and Franks, Harris, and Titman, (1991). How-
ever, only in some instances abnormal return has been found positive after acquisition especially in 
long-run period. 
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Introduction 
Acquisition is an act of acquiring ownership in a property. In terms 
of corporate restructuring it accounts to purchase of controlling interest in 
the share capital of a company. The shares in a company could be pur-
chased either from open market or with the mutual consent of the share-
holders of acquiring company, or by private treaty. The act of acquisition, 
commonly, has a motivation which turns the deal in a specific arrangement 
viz., acquisition to amalgamate, acquisition for substantial voting power, or 
control. The pan-nation literature considers above said arrangements as 
synonym, but the prevailing laws in India make distinction among them e.g., 
corporate restructuring through amalgamation and merger is governed by 
Sections 232, 233, 234, and 237 of Chapter XV of the Companies Act, 2013. 
But, acquisition of shares, takeover, and control are, primarily, adminis-
tered by Regulations 2011, of Security Exchange Board of India (SEBI) on 
Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover (SAST).  
The economic motivation of acquisition has two dimensions derived 
from the theory of firm i.e., cost-efficiency, and firm as nexus of contract. 
The cost efficiency could be achieved, through acquisition as an external 
corporate restructuring, by sharing of resources (Teece and Shuen, 1997; 
Radovic Markovic and Salamzadeh, 2012), or making external investment if 
it lead to innovation (Coase, 1937) or create synergy by remaining in the 
same field (Kumar, 2013a) where the post-deal results are greater than the 
sum of contributing parts (Robert and Lionel, 1967). The nexus approach 
focuses more directly on the institutional aspect and anticipates long-term 
contracts of the company which could be created through acquisition 
(Coad, 2009) and by creating market presence (Kumar, 2012b).  
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The incentive of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) differs on type, 
timing, and purpose of the deal. Besides that the expectations of sharehold-
ers, of both the companies, cannot be ignored which directly connected with 
value maximization. The value created through acquisition has a positive 
effect on the overall firm performance which in turn reflected in stock price 
movements and consequent returns (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Knapp and 
Kronenberg, 2013; Azhar, 2015) and adhere to shareholders’ expectations. 
Some issues related with above discussion have been addressed in the pre-
sent study like is there any change in the market price of shares after acqui-
sition, expectations of the shareholders, and abnormal returns? 
 
Rational and hypothesis  
Acquisition is an instrument of corporate growth strategy as an ex-
ternal restructuring. Henderson (1984) observed that the main objective of 
the growth strategy should be the real growth and increased rate of return 
to the stockholders. The real growth has two facets, first, increase in pro-
ductive value of the company, and second, increase in rate of return to the 
stockholders (Robert and Terence, 1975). Hughes and Singh (1980) suggest 
the average return is the proper way to measure the effects of M&A on prof-
itability comparing pre and post performance. Thus, the first proposition is 
set for the present study as follow. 
H0: There is no change in rate of return of the share price of ac-
quired company in post-acquisition period in comparison of pre-acquisition 
period. 
 i.e., Ri(pre)= Ri(post) 
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Ha: The rate of return of in post acquisition period is increased in 
comparison of pre-acquisition period. 
 i.e., Ri(pre)  Ri(post), or,  Ri(pre)  Ri(post). 
The performance of post-acquisition has been measured, in various 
studies, by either taking accounting results or market price of the share into 
account. The assessment of performance in relation to accounting results is 
constructive when the acquired company was privately controlled by ac-
quiring company. Karen and Dennis (1989) argued that performance meas-
ures with market, industry and, economic effects’, using abnormal returns 
rather than actual returns, helps to accomplish post-acquisition analysis. 
The disadvantages of employing actual returns are, the considerable differ-
ence in the average security betas (i.e., relative risk) among industries (Fos-
ter, 1978), and non-allowance of risk adjusted returns (Karen and Dennis, 
1989). Zollo and Meier (2008) suggest that to assess short-term perform-
ance, one should refer market expectation as exogenous variable to firm 
performance. Thus, second hypothesis of the study is intended as follow. 
H0: The actual returns of the companies are not affected by market 
expectations, or there is no influence of market expectations on actual re-
turns. 
 Ri  (Mkti). 
Ha: The actual returns of the companies are affected by market ex-
pectations. 
 Ri = (Mkti). 
It is evident from the above discussion that estimation of future re-
turn is much commendable as compare to average return. However, Jensen 
(1986) concludes that the post-outcome returns are unsettling because it 
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remains inconsistent with market efficiency and in turns overestimate the 
future efficiency gain from merger. The abnormal return covers two more 
dimensions of performance measurement, first, estimation of future return 
vis-à-vis industry comparison, and second, comparison of actual return and 
stakeholders expectations. The following proposition is laid down following 
above analogy.  
Ho: There is no difference between abnormal return, expected return 
and actual return in post-acquisition period as compare to pre-acquisition 
period.  
 AbRi=ExRi=AcRi=0 
Ha: The actual return and expected return differs and contribute to 
abnormal return. 
ExRi  AcRi 0 
Literature gives mix outcomes on the post-acquisition performance 
like Porter (1985), Salinger (1992), and Thomas (1996) have made post-
acquisition assessment and found improved performance. On the contrary, 
Dewey (1961) argued that most mergers have virtually nothing to do with 
either the creation of market power or the realization of scale economies. 
The Hogarty’s review (1970) explained that the results during last fifty 
years show overwhelmingly that takeovers have had a neutral or negative 
effect on profitability. The outcome of acquired firms had below average 
stock market performance prior to their acquisition (Mandelker, 1974), 
(Langetieg, 1978), and (Franks, Harris, and Titman, 1991). 
A group of studies have examined short-term and long-term per-
formance e.g., Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Ikenberry et.al. (2000) re-
ported that there is negative abnormal monthly return. The studies docu-
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ment negative abnormal returns over the three to five years following over-
whelm positive abnormal returns over short-term period, making the net 
worth effect negative (Andrade et. al., 2001), and (Paul et. al., 2004). 
 
Research methodology 
SEBI provides database which primarily discloses acquisitions on 
the basis of percentage of shares acquired by a company/ individual/ institu-
tion in Target Company. A sample of companies has been retrieved from the 
SAST database for the financial year 2011-12 from the website of SEBI 
those made announcement on acquisition for amalgamation. The companies 
reported their acquisition under 7(1), and 7(3) of SEBI (SAST) regulation, 
2011have been taken into present study. The sample again refined on the 
basis of total percentage of share in Target Company after making commu-
nication under above said regulation. The selected companies which have 
more than 25 percent share in Target Company are considered. The 
amended sample size is of 45 companies.  
The closing share price of respective companies has been retrieved 
from the BSE website i.e., www.bseindia.com . The range of data is primar-
ily covers 400 days, 200 days to pre-acquisition and 200 days after post-
acquisition. The day on which announcement was made has taken as zero 
period, thus data ranges from -200 to 0 to +200 days. The data, thereafter, 
clustered according to duration of performance viz., 10 days, 30 days, 60 
days, 120 days, and 200 days.  The market price of the share of respected 
companies has been considered as key variable to make analysis of post-
acquisition performance. The above said postulates regarding post-
Journal of Entrepreneurship, Business, and Economics, 2015, 3(2): 1–15 
7 
acquisition performance on the basis of actual market price of share is ex-
pressed as follow: 
ARpost-acquisition  ARpre-acquisition  (1) 
Observed Difference Mean =  –  (2) 
Where, 
ARi(PRE) = Actual market price of the shares of each company 
changed in pre-acquisition periods varies from –t say 10 days prior to ac-
quisition till the date of acquisition. 
ARi(POST) = Actual market price of shares of each company changed 
in post-acquisition periods varies from the date of acquisition till last day of 
sample i.e., +t say 10 days after acquisition. 
t= varies according to criterion of performance measurement on 
days basis viz., 10, 30, 60, 120, and 200 days. 
It is evident that expected market return plays vital role to arrive at 
abnormal return which confers true profitability of the shareholders. The 
abnormal return is the actual returns in excess of expected returns as pre-
sented below: 
Abnormal Return = Actual Returns – Expected Returns (3). 
AbR  = AcR – ExR 
To measure expected returns, BSE-S&P 500 has been taken as 
proxy. The change in index value shows varying expectation of the share-
holders in Target Company. Any positive change in index leads to increase 
in their expectation in respect of their own shares and vice-a-versa. It 
means the actual returns of the companies depend upon the performance of 
index (proxy) movement of BSE-S&P 500 (let say Y, as an independent 
Kumar, S. 2015. Substantial takeover of shares and post-aqcuisition performance 
8 
variable). Thus, expected return (let say X, as a dependent variable) could 
be reiterated as follow: 
Xi = i +Yi +I   (4) 
Where, 
Xi  is the expected return of every company of given sample, 
Yi  is the index performance in respect of time when company an-
nounced acquisition, 
  is the intercept of the regression equation, 
  is the coefficient of the endogenous variable, and 
  is the standard error. 
The regression for all sample companies has been calculated sepa-
rately as their date of announcement and respective dates of proxy variables 
varies. Thus, abnormal return for a company calculated in equation (3) with 
the help of equation (1) and (4) defined as 
AbRt =    (5) 
Where, 
 N is the number of companies in sample i.e., 45. The total abnormal 
returns that are then aggregated into average total abnormal return for 
sample is defined as follow: 
TARt =     (6) 
Where, 
the accumulation process begins at the time of –t, comprises daily 
abnormal returns, up to and including day +t, and N is the number of com-
panies in the sample. 
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Empirical results 
The results of comparative actual return during pre and post acqui-
sition has been ascertained by applying paired-sample t-test and presented 
in Table 1. To compute estimated return, regression has been executed by 
taking proxy as endogenous variable and change in actual return as exoge-
nous variable, and results are given in Table 2. The excess of actual return 
over expected return termed as abnormal return and outcome has been ex-
plained in Table 3.  
 
Table 1. Results of Share Price Performance
# 
Duration of Per-
formance Meas-
urement 
Pre-Acquisition 
Mean (1) 
Post-Acquisition 
Mean (2) 
Observed Difference 
Mean  
(3) = (2) - (1) 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
10 days 105.628 111.040 5.412 
2.420 
(0.010)** 
30 days 104.223 114.732 10.509 
2.846 
(0.003)* 
60 days 101.000 117.463 16.463 
3.094 
(0.002)* 
100 days 101.197 118.466 17.269 
2.267 
(0.014)** 
200 days 102.816 153.437 50.621 
1.994 
(0.026)** 
 
# Results are computed by applying paired sample-test. 
  Values given in parentheses are p-values 
*Values are significant at 0.01 level. 
**Values are significant at 0.05 level. 
 
Table 1 states the result of paired sample t-test of actual changes in 
market price of the shares in target companies during different time crite-
rion. The mean value of pre-ten days to acquisition is 105.628, and post-ten 
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days to acquisition is 111.040 shows that there is increased in the market 
price of the shares of target company by mean value 5.412 as stated in ob-
served difference mean. The t-test value, 2.420, is significant at level of 
0.05. The significant t-value suggests not to accept null hypothesis i.e., there 
is no change in market price of the companies after acquisition. The results 
are similar on all above time criterion, and it is evident that the actual mar-
ket value of the shares of target companies has been increased during post-
acquisition period.  
Table 2. Results of Expected Rate of Market Return 
Performance in 
Group of Days 
Pre and Post An-
nouncement Days 
Intercept 
{i} 
Coefficients {i} 
[Standard Error] 
{i} 
t-value {i /i} 
(p-value) 
-10 to +10 Days 
-10 to 0 days -0.099 
-0.0206 
[0.10084] 
-0.2044 
(0.843) 
0 to +10 days -0.1457 
0.1215 
[0.1247] 
0.9747 
(0.3582) 
-10 to +10 Days -0.1011 
0.0430 
[0.0749] 
0.5611 
(0.5812) 
-30  to +30 Days 
-30 to 0 days 0.0461 
-0.2045 
[0.0959] 
-2.1319 
(0.0419) 
0 to +30 days 0.1296 
-0.1199 
[0.0696] 
-1.7231 
(0.0958) 
-30 to + 30 Days 0.0745 
-0.16138 
[0.0577] 
-2.7933 
(0.0070) 
-60 to  + 60 Days 
-60 to 0 Days -0.1329 
0.036 
[0.0515] 
0.7054 
(0.4833) 
0 to +60 Days 0.0577 
-0.1193 
[0.050] 
-2.3838 
(0.0204) 
-60 to + 60 Days 0.045 
-0.1236 
[0.0411] 
-3.004 
(0.0032) 
-120 to +120 
Days 
-120 to 0 days -0.120 
0.0280 
[0.0404] 
0.6934 
(0.4894) 
0 to 120 days -0.040 
0.0662 
[0.0383] 
1.7290 
(0.0864) 
-120 to +120 days 0.0365 
-0.0876 
[0.0270] 
-3.236 
(0.0013) 
-200 to +200 
Days 
-200 to 0 days 0.0188 
-0.1164 
[0.036] 
-3.227 
(0.0014) 
0 to 200 days -0.015 
0.0262 
[0.0274] 
0.9571 
(0.3396) 
-200 to +120 days 0.0213 
0.0654 
[0.0242] 
2.6973 
(0.0072) 
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values within [ ] parentheses are standard error 
values within ( ) parentheses are p-value of the t-test. 
*values are significant at 0.01 level. 
**values are significant at 0.05 level. 
**values are significant at 0.10 level. 
Table 2 presents the estimates of expected market return of shares in 
Target Company. It shows coefficient during pre-ten days is -0.0206 and 
intercept is -0.099. It indicates that the pre-acquisition performance was 
lower than expected return and there was inverse relation between the per-
formance of stock-market and share price of the Target Company. However, 
the test-value is not significant for 10 days basis criterion. Up to thirty days 
prior to acquisition, the coefficient is -0.2045 which is significant at level of 
0.05. The negative sign of the coefficient signifies that the expected return of 
the share substantially declined during this period. Similar results have 
been found afterwards also. On the basis of sixty days criterion, the ex-
pected results were low during post-acquisition and overall period as well. 
However, the expected returns were achieved significantly during post-
acquisition period on the criterion of 120 days. The outcome of expected 
return on 200 days after acquisition is positive but not found significant. 
Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Return (in percentage) 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Pre- Acquisition Post-Acquisition Overall* 
On  10 days basis 
-3.343 
(-0.3343) 
-3.38 
(-0.338) 
-6.78 
(-0.678) 
 On 30 days basis 
-15.55 
(-0.51833) 
-11.42 
(-0.380) 
-22.87 
(-0.762) 
On 60 days basis 
-28.43 
(-0.47383) 
-23.34 
(-0.389) 
-54.62 
(-0.910) 
On 120 days basis 
-61.73 
(-0.51442) 
-52.30 
(-0.435) 
-114.39 
(-0.953) 
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On 200 days basis 
-26.30 
(-0.1315) 
13.37 
(0.066) 
-13.42 
(-0.067) 
( ) values in parentheses are average of abnormal return of different 
duration. 
*overall weighted means starting from pre-acquisition to post-
acquisition e.g., -10 to +10 
Table 3 reveals cumulative abnormal return in percentage. It is evi-
dent from Table 3 that the abnormal return during pre-acquisition period, 
irrespective of time criterion, has been negative which means that the ex-
pected market return was high as compare to actual return. The results are 
similar in post-acquisition period except abnormal return in case of 200 
days. The expected return on the basis of 120 days was positive as given in 
Table 2 but the intercept was negative which impose negative effect on ab-
normal return. 
 
Conclusion 
The value maximization is the decisive intention of corporate restructuring 
especially through acquisitions for amalgamation. It has been investigated 
that the actual returns of the sample companies have been increased across 
the distinct duration ranges from 10 days to 200 days. It emphasized that 
the shares of individual companies have been traded at high value as com-
pared to pre-acquisition value as supported by significant results. The mar-
ket return as the basis of expected results gives varied outcomes Porter 
(1985), and Thomas (1996). There is no improvement has been found in 
post-acquisition period during ten days across the acquisition or the per-
formance remained same as in pre-acquisition period, the results are ap-
proximating to Dewey (1961). There is significant decline in the perform-
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ance, as suggested by negative value of coefficient, pre-30, pre-120, and 
pre-200 days’ performance which leads to turn down post-acquisition per-
formance. The negative coefficient, for post-30, and post-60 days, results 
are confirmed with outcomes of Mitchell and Stafford (2000). However, af-
ter 120 days of acquisition, performance has been found positively signifi-
cant and substantiate the findings of (Andrade, 2001), and (Paul, 2004). 
It has been observed that the average cumulative return remain 
negative during across the period except post-200 days. It is apparent from 
that acquired company has not achieved expected rate of returns or valued 
below than average value of market stock in similar industry. It is been no-
ticed that the sample companies’ overall performance was also low from 10 
to 120 days except 200 days where it has positive and significant results 
which could have been one of the causes of acquisition where company in 
its individual functioning has been performing well but lower than the mar-
ket expectations which attracted the acquiring company make such acquisi-
tion. 
 
 References 
1. Andrade, G., M. Mitchell, & E. Stafford. (2001). New evidence and perspectives on merger. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, 103-120.  
2. Azhar, S. (2015). Impact of liquidity and Management Efficiency on profitability: An Em-
pirical Study of Selected Power Distribution Utilities in India. Journal of Entrepre-
neurship, Business and Economics, 3(1), 82-97. 
3. Coad, Alex. (2009). The growth of firms, UK: Edward Elgar, 124-25. 
4. Coase, R.H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, New Series, 4(16) (November), 
386-405. 
5. Donald, Dewey. (1961). Mergers and cartels: some reservations about policy, Market Eco-
nomic Review, LI (May), 257. 
Kumar, S. 2015. Substantial takeover of shares and post-aqcuisition performance 
14 
6. Foster, G. (1978). Financial statement analysis, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.  
Karen & Dennis, Ibid. 
7. Franks, Julian R., Robert, S. Harris, & Sheriden Titman. (1991). The post merger share 
price performance of acquiring firm, Journal of Financial Economics, 29, 81-96. 
8. Henderson, Gleenn V. (Jr.), Trennpohl, Gray L., & Wert, James E. (1984). An introduction 
to financial management, Canada: Addison-wesley publishing company, 501-518. 
9. Hogary, T.F. (1970). Profits from mergers: the evidence of 50 years. St. John’s Law Re-
view, 44, spring special edition, 378-91. 
10. Hughes, A. & Singh, A. (1980). Mergers, concentration and competition in advanced capi-
talist economies: an international comparison, in eds., Mueller, D.C., the determi-
nants and effects of mergers, Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1-26. 
11. Ikenberry, D., J. Lakonishok, & T. Wemaelen. (2000). Tock repurchases in Canada: per-
formance and strategic trading, Journal of Financial, 55, 2373-2397. 
12. Jensen, M.C. & Ruback, R.S. (1983). The market for corporate control. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 11 (1-4), 5-50. 
13. Jensen, Michael C.(1986). Agency Cost of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers, 
American Economic Review, 76, 323-329. 
14. Karen L. Fowler, & Dennis R. Schmidt. (1989). Determinants of tender offer post-
acquisition financial performance. Strategic Management Journal,50(4) (July- Aug), 
339-350.  
15. Knapp, J. L., & Kronenberg, C. (2013). Strategic Analysis of SMEs’ early Internationalisa-
tion Processes. Journal of Entrepreneurship, Business and Economics, 1(1/2). 
16. Kumar, Sunil. (2012). Post-mergers and acquisitions strategies to create shareholders 
value: agency problem and governance. Asia Pacific Journal of Research in Business 
Management, 3(10) (November), 78-92. 
17. Kumar, Sunil. (2013). Corporate restructuring through mergers  and acquisitions: trends 
and types in India. International Journal of Trade and Global Business Perspectives, 
2(3), 532- 540.  
18. Langetieg, Terence C. (1978).  An application of a three-factor performance index to meas-
ure stockholders gains from merger, Journal of Financial Economics, 6, 365-383. 
19. Mandelker, Gershon. (1974). Risk and returns: the case of merging firms, Journal of Fi-
nancial Econometrics, 1(Dec.), 303-335. 
20. Mitchell, M.L. & E. Stafford. (2000). Managerial decision and long-term performance.  
Journal of Business, 73, 287-320. 
Journal of Entrepreneurship, Business, and Economics, 2015, 3(2): 1–15 
15 
21. Paul Andre, Maher Kooli, & Jean. Francois L’Her. (2004). The long-run performance of 
mergers and acquisitions: evidence from Canadian stock market, Financial Manage-
ment, 33(4) (Winter), 27-43. 
22. Porter, Michael E. (1987). From competitive advantage to corporate strategy. Harvard 
Business Review, 65(3), 43-59.  
23. Radovic Markovic, M., & Salamzadeh, A. (2012). The Nature of Entrepreneurship: Entre-
preneurs and Entrepreneurial Activities. LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing. 
24. Robert W. Ackerman & Lionel L. Fray. Financial evaluation of a potential acquisition, 
financial executive, XXXV, October, 1967, (in edt) Arthur R. Wyatt & Donald E. Ki-
eso, Business combinations: planning and action, Scranton: International Textbook 
Company, 1969, ch. 2. 
25. Robert, A. Hangen, & Terence, C. Langetieg (1975).  An empirical test for synergism in 
mergers.  The Journal of Finance, 30(4), 1003-1014. 
26. Salinger, M. (1992). Standard errors in event studies, Journal of Financial and Quantita-
tive Analysis, 27, 39-53. 
27.  Teece, D.J., G. Pisano & A. Shuen (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic manage-
ment. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 509-33 
28. Thomas H. Brush. (1996). Predicted change in operation synergy and post-acquisition per-
formance of acquired business. Strategic Management Journal, 17(1) (Jan), 1-24. 
29. Zollo, Maurizio, & Meier, Degenhard. (2008). What is M&A performance? Academy of 
Management Perspectives, 22(3) (Aug.), 55-77. 
